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TEMPORAL FORM A.ND EXISTENCE 
GEORGE P. ADAMS 
T HE PROBLEM OF TIME, like other philosophical problems, is a focus of many questions. The answer given to any one 
question presupposes an examination of other questions. 
The philosopher is embarrassed by the necessity of clarifying some 
prior concept before he settles down to a consideration of any one 
concept. Before you can enjoy after-dinner coffee, you must have 
dessert; you cannot have dessert until you have eaten the roast; 
and so on back to the salad and soup. But we are threatened with 
philosophical starvation just because we cannot really enjoy our 
philosophical soup or salad until we have had our philosophical 
dessert, and vice versa. Instead, we are compelled to take one thing 
at a time, dispose of it, and go on to the next. We meet the problem 
of Time the moment we cross the threshold of philosophical reflec-
tion. The serial order of before and after, of change, succession, 
and supersession, means one thing or event at a time, its recession 
and replacement by a successor. It is done witp. and disposed of; 
to it we can never go back. But the order and structure with which 
reflection has to do would appear to posit and demand not only 
~omething different from this, but quite the contrary .. It is circular 
and not serial. Every starting place is tentative and hypothetical, 
subject to revision and reinterpretation. Its context is massive, 
multidimensional, fluid in all directions. The arrow of reflective 
thought, unlike time's arrow, is not set on a single unvarying 
course. It is not surprising that all but a very few of the first-rate 
philosophers should have concluded that the temporal order of 
before and after, universal though it be, is not the last word about 
our experience . 
.All the speakers who have preceded me are in agreement upon 
one point, namely, t!!_~twhat time denotes is not any entity which 
either does or could ex~t by TfseH .. There is no fime per se, no 
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empty time, logically or existentially prior to and independent of 
things and events which are said to exist in time. Ti~!Ji_Sll.Q(§ub-
stantival, but adjectival or relational. I am not sure that any 
philosophers, other than certain natural philosophers such as New-
ton, have ever really thought otherwise. Because they talk about 
the noun "time," it does not follow that they take time to be a sub-
stantive kind of thing which might exist by itself. Time denotes 
some discriminable aspect or ingredient of things and events, and 
one is absolved from remarking upon this when using the term. 
Why do we so easily fall into the habit of thinking and speaking 
of an empty or pure time, a dimension infinitely extended in two 
opposite directions within which things and events, including our-
selves, exist and occur1 Why do we hypostatize Time, and confer 
upon it an independent, substantive status 1 There is, I think, 
something more in evidence here than our general human propen-
sity to hypostatize abstractions. Color is a quality which belongs 
to every perceived object; it is adjectival and pervasive; yet we 
are not tempted to erect a world of empty color in which colored 
things exist. We do just this for space. Persistence and change are 
experienced temporal qualities equally adjectival and pervasive. 
But instead of erecting persistence and change into substantive 
existences, we think of an empty time in which things persist and 
changes go on. Why do we translate the temporal quality of things 
in this manned I think that we do this because the temporal qual-
ity of things is not just a simple quality, as hardness and color are 
qualities of my table. Change and persistence are indeed qualities 
of things and events. But they are relational qualities, that is, 
qualities which exhibit a pattern, a relational structure, a form 
or schema. The relation of succession, of before and after, is dis-
played within every so-called temporal quality. _A __ schematic re-
lational structure is intrinsic to temporal quality. This renders 
temporal quality different from the ordinary run of experienced 
qualities. The redness of the rose, the pain of a toothache, are no 
doubt dependent upon the relations in which the rose and the 
tooth stand to sense organs, nervous system, and various physical 
processes. In this sense these experienced qualities are relational. 
But these relations are, so to speak, extrinsic to the felt qualities. 
Within, these qualities are dense and opaque. They exhibit little 
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or no wealth of internal relational structure. Series, intervals, 
and types of order, providing a field for geometry and analysis, 
are here in abeyance. They just are what they are, felt, intuited 
essences or qualities, whose intrinsic nature is exhausted in the 
immediate experience of them. I do not think that this is quite the 
last work about them, but it will serve to mark the great difference 
between all such qualities and temporal quality. Temporal quality 
is not internally opaque and merely qualitative. It provides an 
inexhaustible and fertile domain for analysis which felt colors and 
toothaches do not. It is because of this difference that we find it 
not only easy but seemingly inevitable to endow Time with an 
independent and intrinsic nature. The relational quality pertain-
ing to felt temporal quality cannot be confined to the situation 
which presents us that quality, in the way in which we do think 
of the redness as being in the rose and the ache as being in the 
tooth. For, whenever we discern a pattern, a formal relational 
structure within a mass of presented data, we have something 
which can be set free from its present locus and embodiment. It 
can now be thought of as applicable to other instances, as char-
acterizing areas of existence beyond the boundaries of presented 
fact. There are features of presented situations which are given 
and discerned as universals in a quite literal sense, that is, as hav-
ing a more general scope and applicability than merely to the 
particular instance in which they are here and now presented. 
This holds of qualities as well as of relational structures. The 
minimum of any presented datum is always a this-such, where the 
quality, the suclmess, contains the possibility of further, indefi-
nitely extended application. But in relational qualities this feature 
is fraught with a peculiar significance. Where a pattern or struc-
ture, characterized by a defining relation, is discerned within 
given experience, its extension beyond the given becomes even 
more clearly indicated. Its · wider applicability is an intrinsic 
meaning of the pattern itself. 
It is as if we were presented with a small stretch of real num-
bers, say those between 5 and 8, and that we discerned the formal 
structure exhibited within this presented stretch. The relational 
schema thus presented would be discriminated from a particular 
entity falling within the presented stretch, such as the number 6. 
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This discrimination of a relational structure from its content or 
matter is at the same time an indefinite extension of the schema 
beyond the boundaries of the presented situation. We think of 
the formal schema as applicable to what is not here and now pre-
sented. An architect's plan for a house could be used for building 
many houses in different places. The plan is adjectival. It is the 
plan of some house, actual or possible. The reification and hypos-
tatizing of Time expresses, no doubt crudely and mistakenly, the 
discovery within felt temporal quality of a relational structure, 
internally inexhaustible and externally extended and indefinitely 
extensible. 
I shall take time to be then a feature, adjective, or quality of 
things experienced. I take the temporal quality to be utterly per-
vasive and universal. It has no merely restricted exemplification 
like the qualities "sweet" and "hard." Can we describe this uni-
versal temporal quality of things experienced in terms of a single 
relational quality, a single type of pattern, or is it complex, con-
taining two or more different structures? I shall hold that the 
temporal quality is the relational quality of earlier and later, of 
before and after, of succession. The defining characteristic of time 
is successiveness. This statement requires me to consider certain 
views according to which there is a temporal quality independent 
of succession. I begin by asking whether we have any experience 
of temporal quality which does not exhibit succession. Can we 
ascribe any meaning to temporal existence which is not character-
ized by the serial order of before and after? I do not think that 
we can. However, there are those who appear to think otherwise. 
Mr. Mackay apparently wishes to distinguish quite sharply be-
tween duration an.cl succession. I understand him to say that in 
the direct experience of something going on, of continuous quali-
tative change, we have duration but not succession. Succession 
means a series. Duration is not a series of events. Moreover, we 
are told that past, present, and future do not constitute a series, 
that a past event can be specified as past without reference to the 
temporal relation of earlier and later. The order of duration runs 
from future possibilities through the present and enduring into 
the past. vVhat Mr. Mackay speaks of as duration appears to be 
what Mr. Loewenberg called "persistence." Reality means dura-
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tion and persistence; these specify the real, nonspecious, non-
successive present. 
Now this distinction between duration ancl succession is, I agree, 
significant and fundamental. It constitutes the crux of the prob-
lem of time. But we may take the distinction in two ways. Either 
we have an experience of duration from which there is lacking 
any before-and-after serial order of successiveness, or our experi-
ence of duration is one in which there -is succession, with its order 
of earlier and later, plus something else. If it should be the latter 
that we have, the temporal relation of before and after would be 
one aspect of duration, persistence, and the present, but it would 
not exhaust either what we experience or what we mean by dura-
tion and persistence. It would be the pervasive abstract temporal 
form of whatever perdures and persists. And it seems to me to be 
the temporal aspect of experience, par excellence. Vvhat a dura-
tion or a persistence might be in which there simply is no serial 
order of succession, I can neither imagine nor conceive. If any-
thing persists or perdures, then the temporal pattern of earlier 
and later does characterize the enduring somewhat, whether I re-
flectively discriminate it or not. Of course, the present may be 
enjoyed without analyzing out its temporal schema, the before 
and after succession of its enjoyed contents. vVhen I listen to mu-
sic, I do not keep saying to myself that the melody I am hearing 
exhibits the temporal pattern of before and after. But when I do 
reflectively consider what I am hearing, and thus perhaps spoil 
the enjoyment, I immediately find just this temporal pattern of 
earlier and later. Duration is more than succession, but it'is always 
at least succession. 
If we take the temporal pattern of succession as pervasive, if 
duration and persistence are also successive, whatever more they 
may turn out to be, then it follows that we cannot hope to escape 
the metaphysical problems set by the relation of before and after 
through the discovery of a temporal quality in which succession 
is lacking. The analysis of the temporal pattern of before and after, 
of succession, provides a crucial test of philosophical method. In 
the problem of time are focused all the perplexities and paradoxes 
of the given, the presented, and the present, of transcendent ref-
erence, of experience and meaning. Let us begin with the inno-
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cent attempt to analyze the meaning of any concept or term. We 
employ a great variety of terms signifying the temporal quality 
of things. How can we tell whether a term stands for anything 
and, if so, what it is to which the term points? Every term can be 
defined by means of other terms, and dictionaries exist in order 
to display this reference and cross-reference among words. But 
if terms are ever to denote things which are other than words, 
this area of terms in discourse must be broken into and invaded. 
The term must initiate a process which leads away from discourse 
into things. What thing can a word stand for? Obviously, it must 
be some thing which is presented to us or had by us independently 
of being named. It must be experienced before it is named and in 
order to be named. Otherwise the name would be a conventional 
symbol or synonym of some other name. Of course, what de facto 
name shall be employed to denote anything is an arbitrary affair . 
.A:ny other. name might have become a~tached to the thing. But 
once attached, that name has a meaning; it denotes a thing in some 
manner presented before it is named. What else can naming, 
thinking, and reflecting do except to indicate some experienced 
state of affairs or some trait which, on the basis of experience, may 
be inferred? Is there any theory of meaning other than an em-
pirical or operational one which can possibly make sense? How 
can you ever know what you are talking about unless it is first 
presented ~o you in actual experience? The critic of empiricism 
seems to be caught in an impossible situation. He professes to 
know something about an existence which is never presented in 
any experience. He seems to be talking about things to which he 
cannot refer and say, "There they are." If they are there, they be-
long to experience; if they are not there, whatever is said about 
them will be, not false, but meaningless. For the empirical posi-
tivist is in the fortunate position of never having to refute as false 
any philosophical or metaphysical proposition. He has only to say 
that it is meaningless because it refers to something not experi-
enced. If it had entered into experience, it would become legitimate 
subject-matter, not for philosophy, but for some empirical science. 
Let us see where we get, with respect to time, when we proceed 
on this basis. It is really quite simple. Whatever is experienced is 
presented. Whatever is presented is, of course, present. What is 
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present is neither past nor future. There is nothing but the pres-
ent. Pastness and futurity denote aspects or phases of the pre-
sented, the present. vVhat the presented present internally con-
tains, whether it yields an experience or intuition of temporal 
diversity, of actual change, of a real before and after-all these 
are further questions which may be postponed. Did I say "post-
poned"? How stupid of me. For when I postpone anything, I 
shove it off into the future. But when I shove anything over the 
front boundary of the presented present, there just now is no-
where for it to go. vVhen I postpone anything, it crashes over the 
precipice of existence and is annihilated. vVhen I gently close the 
door of my house upon an unwelcome intruder I assume that there 
is real empty space in the porch beyond, eager to receive him un-
damaged and whole. I know of course that even an empiricist may 
sometimes wish to postpone something and may remind me that 
the entire act of postponement must take place in the presented 
present, and that it means the presence of ideas, leadings, and 
tendencies presently existent and active. If postponement has any 
meaning, it can only indicate something presented in experience. 
Past and future are either presented in experience or they are not. 
If they are not presented, we can neither know nor say anything 
about them. If they are presented, they are present and not past 
or future. But, I shall be told, this is a caricature of empiricism. 
No empiricist has ever dreamed of confining his world to the bound-
aries of what is actually presented. He makes inferences, he con-
structs tentatively and hypothetically, he projects beyond and fills 
in the gaps between the fragmentary bits of presented experience. 
On this basis and in this way he has as good a right as anyone to 
talk about a past and future which are not present and presented. 
What is the status of such projections and constructions~ From 
the standpoint of any present, the awareness of past and future 
does involve some kind of ideal construction. Now, on the one 
hand, such ideal construction with all of its works falls entirely 
within the present. The present supports the whole weight of the 
construction, in the shape, say, of memory or anticipation. The 
bridge which is thrown out to past and future has but a single 
pier in the present. The present, in its passage and forward move-
ment, carries with it all the past and future. Change in the present, 
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which is all there is, means a change of the past. This is the view 
of Mead. There is behind the present no scroll of elapsed presents. 
Past and future have their locus in mind. Or, on the other hand, 
recognizing the part played by ideal constructions in the present, 
we shall say that they are the vehicles through which we appre-
hend a nonpresentecl but real past and future. The bridge which 
we construct from the present will be supported by two piers, 
one at each end. But the other pier falls outside the boundaries 
of the presented, and it seems that we would require an extraor-
dinary kind of vehicle thus to transport us beyond the boundaries 
of the presented and the present. In ideal construction, we have at 
our disposal the resources of the present, and it becomes necessary 
to scrutinize them with some care. 
What is the present? From any point of view which is wholly 
and literally encased within any present, there would be no pres-
ent as a stretch of time which lies between past and future. Any 
present of experience viewed from within, that is, from its own 
point of view, is a specious present. It is specious in a different 
sense from that in whi.ch the term is generally used. The specious 
present, as employed by James, was specious because it spread 
over more than a momentary instant. A succession of nows, of 
which the earlier must have disappeared before the later arrive, 
is perceived simultaneously in the specious present of James. I 
shall deal with this specious present presently-that is, in some 
present different from this present. I am saying now that any 
present is a specious present unless it belongs to a temporal series 
which includes past and futiue. Any present taken by itself is a 
specious present. It is a real present only when it is viewed as 
falling between a real past and a real future. But to obtain any 
perspective of such a real series comprising past and future as 
well as present you would, apparently, have to occupy a position 
outside of the present. The present thus appears to be doubly 
specious. Within the present, you have to get your first whiff of 
the before and after relation, of temporal form. To do this, you 
must have a simultaneous awareness of succession. This present 
is specious in contrast with a real present, which is a durationless, 
momentary instant. The present is spe~ious in a second sense be-
cause everything that can be presented must fall within the pres-
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ent. The present is now specious in contrast with a real present 
which is viewed as occupying a position between past and future. 
But to survey such a present requires a point of view which tran-
scends the present. By what right could you locate the presented 
in the present unless you stood outside the present and were aware 
of a temporal series which includes more than the present? 
Wholly from within any enjoyed present, that present has no 
external temporal boundaries. It has no locus in time. It is date-
less and tenseless. It is no presentjn contrast with either past or 
future, I am but repeating here what Santayana has so clearly 
seen and said. The fact of experience, from its own point of view, 
is groundless. Viewed wholly from within, it has no successor nor 
is it the inheritor of anything which has gone before. It just is, 
and this "is" has no tense. Santayana's further contention that 
nothing vouched for in actual experience can provide access to 
existence, temporal or otherwise, is another matter. 
The situation and problem here confronting us are but one in-
stance of the whole affair of transcendent reference, of the relation 
between the given and what lies beyond the given, of immediacy 
and meaning. The present i.tlone is given, presented, but we could 
not know it as present except by reference to its position within 
a wider series including past and future, which are not given. 
Were th~y gi._v-en, they wm:ild be. present. To view the present as 
occupyb:ig a temporafposition is already to have transcended the 
present. The view requires a perspective wider than any which is 
accessible within the boundaries of presented and present. 
The solipsism. of the temporal specious present is in the same 
boat as any form of subjectivism and solipsism. Why is it ever 
alleged that presented data are subjective, that they fall inside 
an area bounded by the limits of immediacy, so that a subsequent 
process of precarious inference or irrational animal faith is re-
quired to provide access to what really exists? Any subjectivist 
interpretation of sense data is, as Kemp Smith has said, the result 
of the belief that sensations are mechanically generated through 
brain processes. What I directly perceive is said to be mental or 
subjective only because an outlying field of physical objects, in-
cluding my body and brain, are first realistically assumed as the 
causes that bring about the existence of my sensations. But then 
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one turns around and says that these causes, since they are not 
directly experienced, must be inferred or posited upon the basis 
of their directly experienced effects. Unless they were first appre-
hended as the external and objective causes of sense data, there 
would be no point in supposing these latter to be merely private 
or subjective. The belief in their independent and objective exist-
ence cannot be entirely an affair of inference from the given if that 
is taken to be confined to the immediate, subjective, and present. 
The relation between present and past, as well as between pres-
ent and future, is analog·ous to the relation between presented 
sense data and physical objects. Neither physical objects, nor past 
nor future, can be said to be known through inference from pres-
ent or presented experience. There would be no occasion for mak-
ing the inference, let alone justifying it, unless one first had an 
awareness of the past or of a physical world by reference to which 
the presented is declared to be subjective and not objective, pres-
ent and neither past nor future. Unless one has from the very start 
an awareness of a field which transcends the present, there would 
be no ground for the assertion that one's immediate experience 
occupies a temporal present. This is the elementary and inescapa-
ble paradox of all our knowing. Ever since it found its first ex-
pression in Plato's doctrine of Anamnesis it has dogged the foot-
steps of philosophical reflection, and demanded that we settle our 
accounts with it as best we may. If by empiricism one means only 
that, since to recognize the present one must be outside the present, 
a field transcending the present must be presentable and there-
fore, after all, in some fashion presented, then of course the limits 
of empiricism are ipso facto the limits of all science and philoso-
phy, and Plato and Spinoza are as empirical as Locke and Hume. 
This is surely wrong. Empiricism, if it is to mean anything definite 
at all, denotes an attempt to stay within the presented, to regard 
anything not presented either as an inference from or a projection 
of the presented, or posited by the exigencies of life and practice 
with which the criteria of knowledge are simply not concerned. 
Thus, a present which stands by itself, into which something 
called past or future is absorbed, or which is thought to provide 
the sole basis from which past and future may be inferred, is a 
specious present. In contrast with such a specious present, a real 
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preseIJ.t would be viewed as part of a temporal series which in-
cludes more than the temporal present. Were there no awareness 
of such a more inclusive temporal span, all that could possibly be 
said would be that such and such items are presented, are being 
experienced, without in any way implying the present tense. If 
what is presented is apprehende·d as belonging to or occurring at 
a present time, it is because we are aware of something more than 
just the presented. What is that more than the presented which 
leads us to locate the presented in a limited region of a temporal 
series and call it a temporal present? It can only be, I think, a 
schema or relational structure, a type of order whose defining 
principle is just the relation of before and after. We apply this 
schema to the whole of what is presented. It then becomes known 
as something lodged between that which came before and that 
which is to come after. We apply a temporal form to the totality 
of what is presented. The temporal pattern is simply the transi-
tive, asymmetrical relation of before and after. It is through the 
employment of this pattern that the presented-which, as such, 
is tenseless-is transformed into the temporal present. For this 
reason I think that the _relation of before and after is, logically, 
more fundamental than the relation of past, present, and future. 
McTaggarl's B series is logically prior to the A series. The A 
series is the result of applying the pattern supplied by the B se-
ries to any mass of presented experience. As we have seen, it is 
this which enables us to understand why we so readily think of 
time per se, of empty time, of Time with a capital T. For what is 
this save the bare sch·ema of before and after? And how much do 
we not owe to our human interest in forms and patterns abstracted 
from their particular exemplifications and instances? Of course· 
they are abstract and empty, but they are none the less fruitful. 
That the discernment in experience and nature of such abstract-
able universals is the sole basis for our knowledge of the possible, 
was the theme of my paper a year ago. I there held that knowledge 
of the really possible is the application beyond the actual of pat-
terns and schemata, types and universals, discerned within the 
actual. I am now saying that our knowledge of the actually pre-
sented as a temporal present is likewise the application to the 
whole of the presented of a temporal form. 
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The temporal schema of before and after, when applied to the 
actually presented, discloses it as contained within a structure 
which transcends the actual. It discloses the presented as lying 
between a real past and a real future. Neither the past nor the 
future are actual in the sense in which the present is actual. The 
actual is what is being enacted. What has been and what will be 
enacted are not actual. But it does not follow that they are noth-
ing real or that they are only shadows cast by the actual. This 
distinction between the actual and the real seems to me both in-
escapable and fundamental. The actual is that fragment of the 
real which is presented. In undergoing the conditions necessary 
for its presentation in experience, the real may be altered, simpli-
fied, and pared down to the scale and perspectives imposed by the 
exigencies of animal life. To whatever degree we may suppose this 
to occur, the actual is apprehended within a real context which 
transcends the boundaries of what is literally experienced and 
presented. Our awareness of that wider context is neither a literal 
transcript of what is actually experienced nor a sheer inference 
from the stuff of presented experience. Knowledge is from the 
very start more inclusive than literal experience of the actual and 
the presented. There is no better instance of this than time itself. 
The only time that is actual is present time. In apprehending it 
as present we also apprehend a nonpresented, nonactual, but real 
past and future. In short, our awareness of a time order tran-
scends our enjoyment of all that is presented in actual experience. 
We apprehend the presented as a temporal present between a 
real past and a real future because we apply to the presented as a 
whole the relational pattern of successiveness, of before and after. 
It is through the employment of such relational patterns that the 
actual is taken as a phase, moment, or fragment of structures 
which transcend the actual. If the presented were merely enjoyed 
for what it is, as presented and given, the real would collapse into 
the actual, the boundaries of our world would coincide with the 
boundaries of the presented. Or rather, it would never occur to 
us to draw any distinction between our world and the world. 
But what of the temporal form itself, the relational pattern of 
before and after 1 How do we come by this so as to apply it to the 
presented and thus transform the presented actual into a tempo-
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ral present? Do we or do we not actually experience temporal 
succession, the relation of before and after? That we have and 
employ the idea of temporal order is indubitable. We use it, as we 
have seen, to transcend the eternal now of the presented and to 
convert it into a temporal present. But the results of this trans-
formation appear to be utterly paradoxical. On the one hand, the 
presented actual becomes extended backwards and forwards into 
a real past and future. The actual is set in a wider context of the 
real which both transcends the actual and is continuous with it. 
But the time form, the relational pattern of before and after, is 
not only applied, in wholesale fashion, to the whole of the pre-
sented. It is also employed as an instrument in the internal anal-
ysis of the presented. Within the presented, earlier and later are 
discriminated. In any presented duration, change, or persistence, 
the distinction of before and after breaks out. No matter how short 
the presented span may be supposed to be, within that span there 
is a before and after. And what came before, the earlier, must have 
gone by the time the later comes upon the scene. No before and 
after can coexist. Existence or the actual collapses into an instan-
taneous durationless moment. Thus, at the same time that the 
presented actual is expanded into the time order inclusive of 
indefinitely more than the present, it is also contracted into the 
momentary, the durationless, the instantaneous. The application 
of the temporal schema of before and after to the presented has 
these two divergent and contradictory results. It opens the win-
dows of the present upon the wide expanse of past and future. It 
also appears to shave off the edges of the presented until all tem-
poral quality and expanse disappear. We had hoped that the tem-
poral pattern, as something universal and formal, might provide 
the means of transcending the actual. It now threatens to destroy 
the very actuality of the presented, and to pulverize the actual 
present into a changeless, momentary instant. Here is a form, a 
categorial relation, originating in experience and then employed 
to condemn as specious the very experience which engenders it. 
I suspect that we have here stumbled upon a significant and per-
vasive aspect of experience, paradoxical though it be. For whence 
can any ideal, any thought of a possible better, arise if not from 
the presented features of experienced and actual situations? But 
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when formulated and made articulate, the ideal condemns the 
actual as not being what it ought to be or might be. The processes 
of life and experience engender forms and ideal structures which 
in their turn take the lead and assume mastery. They now expand 
and transform, even condemn and destroy the very processes in 
which they have arisen. 
It is, then, to a present said to be specious and unreal that we 
are now brought. The concept of the specious present was domes-
ticated, though not invented, by James, in the interests of psycho-
logical description. It was designed to express the fact that, in 
James's words, "our consciousness never shrinks to the dimensions 
of a glow-worm spark. The knowledge of some other part of the 
stream, past or future, near or remote, is always mixed in with 
our knowledge of the present thing."* The minimum of conscious-
ness is a duration block. We have a direct awareness of succession, 
duration, and persistence. What has just gone and is now slipping 
away is simultaneously perceived with that which is coming in. 
The difficulties and contradictions which inhere in such a "spe-
cious" present are notorious. They were dealt with at length by 
Mr. Loewenberg and Mr. Mackay, and prompted the former to 
seek for a real and nonspecious present. He believed that he was 
on the track of the nonspecious present in the recognition of per-
sistence and persisting things. Here is a present which is restricted 
neither to a durationless instant, nor to any span of successive 
moments which appear to be perceiv_ecl simultaneously. I, too, 
should like to discover a nonspecious present, but I do not feel so 
confident that the notion of persistence offers us our best hope; 
for I suspect that the contradictions disclosed within the psycho-
logical specious present threaten to break out within persistence. 
These contradictions, or alleged contradictions, are present wher-
ever you have the temporal form of before and after, earlier and 
later, But this temporal pattern is universal and pervasive. It in-
vades duration, persistence, the present itself. The crucial urgency 
of this temporal relation of before and after lies in its bearing upon 
the question of existence and reality. Time means that anything 
existing, existing now, has followed upon something else which 
did exist but no longer exists, and comes before another something 
*James, Psychology, I: 606. 
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which may or will exist but does not now possess existence. It is 
this temporal pattern of succession which apparently compels us 
to say that change and succession as experienced are specious. It 
also drives us to say that the real itself cannot change, cannot 
even endure and persist as something unchanging. The defects of 
the specious present are not only epistemic, involved in any aware-
ness of temporal flux; they are also constitutive of any objective 
duration or persistence, characterized by the relation of before 
and after. For what condemns the perception of duration to be 
specious is the fact that any duration, however short, consists of 
a plurality of positions defined by the relation of earlier and later. 
The supposed contradiction inherent in a simultaneous perception 
of successive moments but translates into the language of psy-
chology the impossibility of the coexistence of any successive mo-
ments. Of two successive moments, t and t'-related, that is, as 
before and after-when t exists, t' does not yet exist. And when 
t' exists, t no longer exists. If you are looking for existence ex-
empt from this discrepancy, you cannot stop short of a duration 
so tiny that no relation of before and after breaks out within its 
boundaries. Such an existence is infinitesimal and has no boun-
daries. Within it nothing can happen. 
Thus the same logic which condemns a perceived duration as a 
specious present must also condemn any occurrence, any objec-
tive happening, as spurious and specious. The specious present is 
a present the whole of which cannot exist. There are, indeed, addi-
tional difficulties in the psychological specious present. In intuited 
duration or change, we apprehend the passage from earlier to 
later. We discriminate between two phases, one of which comes 
before the other. But if we are to apprehend any relation, the 
related terms must be simultaneously discriminated. They must, 
together with the relation between them, be present. But the ear-
lier is not present when the later is. This is just what is meant 
when it is said to be earlier. An objective occurrence is exempt 
from this difficulty. Two successive phases of any persisting thing 
need not be dependent upon any discrimination of a perceiver. 
But the fundamental difficulty is not thereby avoided. How much 
of the persistent exists now? How inclusive is a real now? If it has 
any finite stretch whatever, it is characterized by an internal di-
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versit:y of before and after, which cannot exist together. If exist-
ence belongs to one moment, it is lacking in all earlier and later 
moments. Thus, if the span of perceived duration, the psycholog-
ical present, is specious, so is the existence of any event whatever. 
If the specious present is condemned because successive events 
cannot be held together in one act of perceiving, every event must 
be condemned. An event takes time. It has a duration. Within that 
duration there is the difference between earlier and later. They 
cannot coexist. But both are intrinsic to the event, therefore the 
event cannot exist. If past events have no existence, neither can 
any earlier moment or aspect of a single event exist at the time 
its later moments transpire. The world exists momentarily at any 
one instant of time. It is annihilated at that instant and a new 
world created at the next instanfoftime. Events, changes, persist-
ence, ancf ex1stence beyond an instant all become equally specious. 
Where have we gone astray in reaching so intolerable a result 1 
For I assume that events do occur, things change, and something 
persists, and that any analysis which leads to the conclusion that 
such things as these are specious has somewhere blundered. The 
difficulty lies, I think, in our having assumed that the temporal 
form, the relation of before and after, taken by itself, determines 
the conditions of existence. All existence may well be subject to 
this temporal pattern, but the question of what exists is not to be 
answered solely with respect to the requirements of the temporal 
order. If the time order of before and after exclusively dominates 
the determination of existence, then no span of time within which 
there is necessarily a before and after, can exist. And if anything 
whatever exists beyond a momentary instant, then the time form 
of before and after does not exclusively determine what may be 
said to exist. This is to say that in every event, however short, the 
momentary instant is transcended. There is an existent something 
which spreads across a plurality of instants. This is just what an 
event is. Its occurrence, which is its existence, occupies a span of 
time within which the temporal relation of before and after may 
be discerned. The temporal order is a character of events, of occur-
rences. It is a perverse procedure to use the time form of before 
and after, which is an_ adjective of events, in such a way as to 
declare the original substantive event nonexistent, except that 
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part of the event which coincides with an instantaneous now. Un-
less you are willing to ascribe existence to a duration within which 
an earlier phase is followed by a later, you cannot so much as talk 
about an event, an occurrence. If the world contains such events 
as lightning flashes and muscle twitches, then there are exist-
ences which occupy a duration block. Lightning flashes and muscle 
twitches are short events. But if the world contains such events 
as these, I can see no grounds based upon the supposed require-
ments of the temporal form of earlier and later which prevent 
one from ·ascribing existence to occurrences which occupy a longer 
span. If there are existences which transcend by ever so little an 
instantaneous now, then, so far as anything about time is con-
cerned, there can be existences and occurrences having any time 
span imaginable. If a lightning flash exists as a single event, so 
can a thunder storm, the erosion of a river bed, the evolution of 
the solar system. If a muscle twitch exists and occurs, then the 
writing of this paper, the living of my life, the rise, of modern 
capitalism, the evolution of humanity occur and exist. My state-
ment is hypothetical. If an occurrence so nearly momentary as a 
flash of lightning exists, then there is nothing which can be drawn 
from the purely temporal relation of earlier and later to prevent 
one from ascribing existence to any occurrence so long as it is one 
occurrence, a single individual event. I may put it in this way. It 
is asserted that the rise of modern capitalism cannot be said to 
exist as a whole because it consists of an historical sequence of 
events. The earlier events transpire and occur before the later 
events. An event has existence only when it is occurring. Past 
and earlier events are not occurring. Therefore they do not exist. 
The banking operations of the Fuggers are not now going on. But 
if this be so, then the same analysis must be applied to any occur-
ring event, however brief it may be. For the relation of earlier 
and later, of before and after, applies to a flash of lightning just 
as much as it applies to the development of modern capitalism. 
The earlier phase of the flash has occurred and is gone when the 
later phase occurs. If what has gone is synonymous with what does 
not exist, then there can be no occurrence or existence of a light-
ning flash. Now I cannot see that it is incumbent upon any phil-
osophy to prove that there do occur such events as lightning 
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fl.ashes. Unless such events existed, there would be no temporal 
order of before and after. Just this is the meaning of the assertion 
that there is no time an sich, that it is adjectival to events and 
processes. 
I am compelled to conclude that the so-called and miscalled 
specious present is as real as any event whatever. When I listen 
to music, I am conscious of a duration within which I am aware 
of the sounds actually being heard as belonging to an entire move-
ment or sonata. I certainly do not hear all the chords comprising 
the sonata in any one present. The present in which the opening 
chords are presented, actually heard, is not the present in which 
the final chords are heard. The focus of actuality traverses a real 
entity, the whole sonata. The event which is the playing of the 
sonata may have a time span of ten minutes. It exists throughout 
its entire duration. The physiological and psychological rhythms 
of my body-mind set far narrower limits to my events, to any one 
actual present in my experience. Hence, for me, the chords actu-
ally heard in any one present are embedded within occurrences 
belonging to a real event which has a duration overlapping that 
of any actual sounds. The real encompasses the actual and, under 
the temporal form, it denotes events within events, each enduring 
throughout its own occurrence. The existence, that is, the occur-
rence of events determined by my physiological mechanism and 
rhythm is no more specious than is the occurrence, duration, and 
existence of the whole sonata. My awareness of what is not actually 
being heard is a consciousness of something not present. The total 
field of awareness, the whole sonata, transcends the boundaries of 
what is actually being heard. 
There is nothing, then, in the temporal relation of earlier and 
later which determines the boundaries of an event's existence 
and occurrence. The temporal form cannot restrain our ascribing 
occurrence to existence spread out over a long time. Once the in-
stantaneous moment is transcended, there is nothing about the 
temporal relation to tell us where to stop in drawing the limits of 
occurrent, existing events.We have now to ask what it is that does 
determine the boundaries of any event. What makes any event, 
long or short, an individual event f This is at the same time the 
question of the boundaries of any present. The occurrence of any 
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event transpires in some present. If an event is entirely over, then 
its occurrence took place in a present which has now become past. 
We are to ask, then, what is denoted by any present, by any indi-
vidual, occurring event. vVe have seen that we get no help from 
the formal temporal relation of earlier and later. If we take this 
as a touchstone, every present and every event are whittled down 
to an infinitesimal instant in which nothing happens. So far as the 
temporal pattern is concerned, the way is open to make an occur-
ring event and the present in which it occurs as inclusive as may 
be required .on other grounds. 
What does determine the boundaries of any present event 1 
There are two possible answers to this question. One is that the 
boundaries of an occurring event are set by the so-called specious 
present of an observer. What is now occurring depends upon the 
span of time which is perceived as a present duration block. There 
are no natural divisions in processes as they go on. The other is 
that the boundaries of occurring events are intrinsic to events 
. themselves. The event is an objective entity whose duration span 
is independent of any perceiver's so-called specious present. 
The first of these two views is subjective. The unity ascribed to 
an event, the time during which it is said to be now occurring and 
present, is read into an otherwise continuous process. The cleav-
age between present and past, between what is now going on and 
what has occurred, is determined by the chance nature of some 
perceiver's time span. That acts as a cutter which slices the con-
tinuous processes of nature into present, past, and future. This 
theory is, I think, attended by all the difficulties which encumber 
any subjectivistic theory. Can we be content to make the arbitrary 
length of our time span the measure of the existence and duration 
of nature's events 1 An observer with a longer time span would 
report as now present occurrences which an observer, equipped 
with a shorter time span, would locate in the past. Here again, I 
suspect that such a view is ultimately the result of supposing that 
the temporal form of before and after, taken by itself, determines 
existence. Only, in this illustration, existence is not pulverized into 
a momentary instant in which there is no duration. Existence is 
now evenly spread over the entire series of instants defined in 
terms of the temporal order of before and after. Slow-moving, 
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continuous changes characterize the entire series. Existence is 
identified with the flux of continuous change and process. Within 
this continuous process, there really are no events, that is, no in-
dividual temporal existences which introduce natural boundaries, 
rhythms, and crises into the even flow of continuous process. Ex-
istence, so conceived, is indifferent to the distinction between 
present and past because any place in which the series is cut is 
wholly arbitrary. If it is introduced at all, it is only from the side 
of an observer and the duration of any present but reflects the 
contingent time span which the observer happens to have. The 
traditional assumption of orthodox science, that science is con-
cerned with process and not with events, implies that in truth 
there are no events except arbitrarily selected slabs of process 
whose duration, occurrence, and existence are determined by 
nothing intrinsic. 
How is an event distinguished from a process 1 A process as 
such may be analyzed, without remainder, into a succession of 
states, one after another. The temporal schema of before and after, 
and nothing else, is the determining form of process. Unbroken 
continuity both within a process, taken as something finite, and 
spreading indefinitely beyond its edges into past and future, 
is the characteristic earmark of process. Ideally, nature, when 
brought under this category, is one continuous process. We may 
in thought, or in the interests of action, slice the continuous proc-
ess into segments. But there is nothing within the process itself 
to indicate where such cuts should be made. In such a world of 
· continuous process, there are no events. For an event is an occur-
rence which has natural boundaries. It has a beginning and an 
end. It is individual. An event marks a discontinuity and break 
in the continuous flow of process. Events may be said to be em-
bedded within process. They supervene upon process. This is only 
to say that the temporal form of before and after does not deter-
mine events in the same complete manner in which it determines 
process. If the world were nothing but process, we should have to 
say either that the world exists at an instant or that the entire 
process exists. Either existence would be pulverized to a moment 
or time would be spatialized and the world process conceived as 
spread out in its entirety in the dimension of time. It is the exist-
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ence and occurrence of events which yields something between 
these two extremes. Events have natural boundaries within the 
continuous flow of process. Events are individual existences. 
We may now go one step fa;ther. In the occurrence and exist-
ence of any event, the temporal pattern of before and after is 
transcended. There is something that perdures throughout a suc-
cession of next-to-next moments and constitutes them phases or 
aspects of an individual event. vvhen an event is viewed as an 
arbitrarily selected slab of process, this perduring somewhat is 
neglected and abstracted from. The event is regarded solely under 
the rubric of succession, of before and after. The event is dissolved 
into process. There is no event which cannot be so treated. Science 
is, in the large, such a description of occurrences, which views all 
individual events as melted in the continuous flow of process. The 
pattern of such description is the temporal pattern of before and 
after. This is what causality means for scientific description. This 
merging of individual, historical events with their natural bound-
aries into continuous process is the meaning of the statement that 
scientific description is not concerned with individuals. 
What is it that can be said to perdure from the beginning to the 
end of a natural, historical, and individual event? I have spoken 
in a previous paper of such a pervasive, perduring somewhat as 
a "general scheme," a "governing tendency." An event is charac-
terized by the operative presence, throughout a span of duration, 
of a determining pattern whose perdurance binds into an indi-
vidual event what otherwise would be merely successive moments 
of a continuous process. What was called by Hegel and Marx a 
dialectical process is something of this sort. It is continuous proc-
ess, characterized by the temporal form of before and after, plus 
the presence of dramatic, individual unities which are more than 
merely temporal. Accumulation, tension, transition to new indi-
vidual forms and structures, crises-all these and more mark the 
event, one may say the dramatic character of the actual processes 
of nature and history. Neither nature nor life is just one thing 
after another, whether qualified with the familiar epithet or not. 
They are this, to be sure. But there are events as well as processes. 
How inclusive may an event be and still be an event? Since an 
event marks a natural division within process and exhibits a pat-
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tern other than just the temporal form of succession, it follows 
that the temporal relation itself provides no criterion for deter-
mining how long or short an occurrent event must be. We have 
seen that if we take such a temporal form as alone determinative, 
we shall say that existence belongs only to the present instant, or 
to the entire process. \ff e either pulverize existence or spatialize 
time. The inclusiveness of any individual event is determined by 
the general scheme, the governing tendency, the operative uni-
versal of just that event. Nothing derived from the temporal form 
of before and after prescribes its occurrence, duration, or exist-
ence. Were the whole of nature one individual event, displaying 
the development of a single theme, then the whole of nature would 
comprise one single duration, existing in one present. For such a 
monism, there would be no past or future. Time would enter only 
as the form of existence of one single event. Time relevant to it, 
if indeed it could still be called time, would be one eternal present. 
Actuality would characterize all that is real. The nature and his-
tory which we know comprise an indefinite plurality of events. 
Events in the plural happen. They come into being, endure, are 
actual throughout their duration, and perish as actual events. But 
in ceasing to be actual they do not become just nothing. They are 
enacted and remain real. They continue to possess just the kind 
of existence which the time form of before and after permits. For 
although the time form does not prescribe the conditions of the 
duration or existence of events, it is a form which permits lapsed 
actualities, no longer actual just because they are lapsed, to in-
habit the domain. of the real past. The actuality, occurrence, and 
presentness which they once had is gone forever. But that they 
were once actual is no consequence of anything now imputed to 
them by us from the standpoint of our actual present. They had 
that actuality in their own right, and this is just what we mean 
when we speak of them as past. 
The plurality and diversity of nature's events is exhibited not 
only in the successive supersession of her happenings, of her 
actualities. For every event is internally manifold and comprises 
constituent events. The French Revolution was one event. The 
existence of the French Revolution was its enactment. The enact-
ment endured through a span of time. The Fall of the Bastille was 
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a constituent event of the French Revolution. And that event 
comprised other events-shouting, throwing stones, and battering 
down walls. It often happens, though not always, that the more 
inclusive a single event is, the more dilute and formal becomes the 
defining principle which marks it off as an individual occurrence. 
At the limit of such dilution, an event melts into process, flux, 
mere successiveness. But the temporal form is never wholly in 
abeyance. Events terminate and are followed by later events. The 
event, having duration, is superimposed on the bare form of suc-
cession. In the duration of events and of every present, the merely 
temporal relation is transcended but never absent. Whatever en-
dures and persists, whatever is present, bears witness both to the 
irrelevance of the merely temporal, of sheer successiveness, and 
to its inescapable presence, ensuring the eventual termination of 
every event, including the reading of this paper. 
